Introduction
Most discussions about decision-making in the WTO currently revolve around the issues of legitimacy and efficiency. The issue of legitimacy is linked with the extending powers of the WTO, and is often related to the issue of state sovereignty. Indeed, in line with the growing international cooperation among states, the WTO is being allocated a number of powers that were traditionally the realm of the nation state, leading some scholars to raise the issue of the state's loss of sovereignty as a consequence of this transfer of powers. 1 In addition, the issue of legitimacy relates to the impact that WTO decision-making has on individuals -referred to as democratic legitimacy. 2 Pursuant to the imperatives of both notions of legitimacy, the scope of this transfer of powers to the WTO as well as the evolution of the type of powers transferred should have an impact on the design of WTO decision-making procedures; indeed, the modalities of these procedures that legitimize the output of decision-making (this being a prerequisite of compliance 3 ) have to adapt to the type of powers exercised (according to the idea of a varying legitimacy requirement) 4 . Previous contributions addressing the issue of legitimacy in WTO decision-making include the debate on WTO constitutionalization; 5 in this context, some authors have argued that the WTO rules cannot serve a constitutional function in part because of the deficiencies of WTO decision-making procedures with respect to legitimacy. In addition, some scholars who have been calling for more transparency and participation in WTO decision-making, in the form of NGOs or parliamentary participation, have highlighted in their work the weakness of WTO procedures with respect to legitimacy. 6 In this paper, we make our own assessment of this issue by dissecting the WTO decision-making process and distinguishing what we will call its three components; indeed, like any other decision-making process, WTO decision-making is a combination of three parameters that we identify as the object (nature or type of power), the organ and the procedural mode.
Since the design of the organ and the procedural mode is a function of the type of power exercised (idea of varying legitimacy requirement), our first step is to define WTO powers. In the second and third steps, we take a look at the composition of WTO organs and at the procedural modes through which they operate, to allow us to determine to what extent the combination of the three elements in the WTO setting fulfill legitimacy requirements.
Efficiency (or operative efficiency) is the second general issue that is raised in connection with WTO decision-making. Since the Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, many authors have expressed concern that WTO decision-making, in particular because of its consensual procedural mode, is no longer functioning properly, and that paralysis is threatening the organization. 7 The cumbersome functioning of the WTO, or the paralysis of its policy-making function, can have various consequences. First is the risk that some players will turn to other forums, therefore threatening the very existence of the multilateral trading system; 8 second, 3 On the connection between legitimacy and compliance in general, see FRANCK T. M. (1988) , "Legitimacy in the International System", 82 AJIL 705-759. 4 We concentrate here on the so-called input legitimacy, or procedural legitimacy; on the multiple facets of the concept of legitimacy, see ELSIG M. The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. 8 In chapter 5, the Sutherland Report looks at the mechanisms of negotiations and decisionmaking in order to consider whether structures and procedures are optimally designed, focusing on the consensus rule. Thus it is addressing the efficiency issue, and further links it this paralysis can cause an imbalance of powers between the political and the judicial branch of the WTO, affecting the legitimacy of the latter's outcomes.
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Using the approach consisting in distinguishing the three parameters of decision-making, we address in the second part of this work the various propositions for reform that have been made by scholars with respect to legitimacy and efficiency, and explain how both issues are closely intertwined.
1.
The three parameters of decision-making 1.1. The object of decision-making
In the debate on consensus and efficiency in the WTO, one relevant proposal that has been made by several authors is to define a typology of WTO decisions in order to submit these decisions to varying procedural modes. Behind this proposition lies the idea that various degrees of legitimacy requirements exist with respect to various types of decisions. This attempt of defining the object of WTO decision-making is therefore directly connected to the issue of legitimacy 10 . Some suggest a rather vague distinction between decisions on procedural aspects and more substantial decisions.
11 A slightly more detailed proposition is to separate housekeeping decisions, which would cover the internal matters of the organization, as well as day-to-day decisions that would relate to the application and interpretation of existing rules, from decisions by which new rules are created.
12 A further distinction could be made between decisions that affect the rights and obligations of Members and those with no such effect, as referred to in the amending clause of Article X WTO Agreement.
With a view to define different legitimacy requirements in WTO decisionmaking, we first refer to Article III of the WTO Agreement to draw up a typology of with member's political considerations ("political impetus"), spelling out all the external parameters that have a bearing on the process (p. 61-62). 9 10 We must recall here that issues of legitimacy can be considered through two different perspectives. The first perspective regards the impact of the WTO on the sovereignty of states and informs legitimacy requirements pursuant to the theory of international law (international perspective); the second perspective is the impact on the individual and has to do with legitimacy requirements in the national law-making sense, that is democratic legitimacy (national perspective). However both kind of legitimacy are often closely intertwined since powers that states transfer to the WTO will often be of a kind that has direct impact on individuals. 11 Our challenge here is to identify WTO decisions that are of a legislative type, as distinct from those that would be of a rather executive type.
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First we focus on the legal texts and make a formal enumeration of those WTO decision-making powers that could be either considered as legislative or executive; then we make a material assessment of the impact of WTO decisions in order to further characterize these powers. Article IV on the institutional structure of the organization allocates some general powers to the organs it is establishing. The Ministerial Conference, which is the highest body in the hierarchy, "shall carry out the functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to this effect (…), having the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreement".
On the second level, the General Council shall conduct the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals between its meetings. Furthermore, it has general guidance over the third-level councils (one example of which is the approval of their rules of procedure), and can assign functions to them not provided for by the agreements. 13 In so doing, we re being inspired by national constitutional theory that uses material criteria to define those state's acts that require parliamentary adoption, pursuant to the material aspect of the principle of the rule of law. This material aspect requires that some decisions must be adopted through a democratic procedure because of the impact they have on the individuals. In Swiss constitutional theory, this impact is abstractly defined using the criterion of importance (see Art. 164 of the Federal Constitution), which is further concretized by various criteria (see: AUBERT J. Article X, which covers decision-making, refers to particular kinds of decisions. The Ministerial Conference or the General Council should adopt authoritative interpretations of the agreements on the basis of a recommendation by one of the third-level Councils when one of the agreements they oversee is under consideration (paragraph 2). Waivers of an obligation in the agreements may be decided by the Ministerial Conference, on the basis of a report produced by one of the third-level Councils when the agreement they oversee is at issue (paragraph 3).
Then, according to Article X, the Ministerial Conference may decide to submit an amendment (which can be proposed by a Member or one of the thirdlevel Councils when one of the agreements they oversee is under discussion) to the Members for acceptance. In some cases, the Ministerial Conference may approve amendments without submitting them to the Members for acceptance (paragraphs 6 and 7).
Attributions of power in the side Agreements
The agreements of Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement set up a number of bodies and attribute powers to them. Here we try to characterize these powers and point out the recurrent features contained in these agreements. 
The impact of WTO decisions
Some of the powers allocated to the WTO organs, as enumerated above, have the potential to exercise such an impact on the individual that it could be assimilated to a legislative kind of power. This is the case with respect to the power of the Ministerial Conference and General Council to adopt legally binding decisions in the form of primary rule-making or secondary rule-making. Also, we see that some lower bodies can develop rules on the basis of their forum function with respect to harmonization.
On the other hand, functions of WTO organs such as review, interpretation and concretization are closer to what we refer to as an executive function, having less impact on the individual.
The capacity of the WTO to adopt legal rules (its quasi legislative function) has often been referred to in the doctrine as positive integration. Art. XIX para. 3 GATS: the GATS Council shall carry out assessment of trade in services in overall terms for the purpose of establishing negotiating guidelines and procedures, as well as to establish some procedures for rectification or modification of schedules (para. 5). negotiations of the Uruguay Round, and which addresses trade in agriculture, services and intellectual property, all of which rely heavily on domestic regulation.
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KRAJEWSKI emphasizes that these norms define detailed individual rights and public obligations that limit the political choices of national law-makers. 57 As well some authors, by referring to the inappropriateness of the adoption's process of certain WTO decisions (which is no regular on-going legislative process) are implicitly pointing to the impact that these decisions have on the individuals. Thus MAVROIDIS, arguing that the "WTO strikes down national regulations that protect food, safety and the environment", 58 notes that it always acts after the fact and that a "body of international administrative law" for the standard setting process has yet to be adopted. 59 Likewise, COTTIER/OESCH assume that no independent law-making body with regulatory powers is formally established within the WTO, and that WTO rules are essentially adopted as package deals at the end of negotiations rounds whose working procedures and structures are defined by Ministerial Declarations.
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At this point, we look at some existing WTO rules to assess the impact that WTO decisions can have on individuals. Among other examples, Article 2.2 TBT Agreement contains a code of good conduct enumerating legitimate policy objectives, thus restricting the policy autonomy of the Members, while Article 2.4 TBT enjoins Members to apply international standards, thus invalidating their policy-making capacity.
In addition, the SPS Agreement prescribes positive action to be taken by governments, calling for the harmonization of measures on the basis of existing standards (Article 3.3), prescribing modalities of risk assessment (Article 5.1) and risk management (Articles 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).
Other examples of rules that have a direct effect on the policy-making of Members include the procedural rules of the GATT Agreement regarding publication requirements (Article X), customs regulations (Article VIII) and rules of origin (Article 9 Agreement on Rules of Origin).
Further, the production and consumption of services are subject to domestic regulations for which WTO rules provide some disciplines that mostly cover transparency requirements and unfair application of rules. In addition, WTO rules regulate exceptions that Members may apply to reconcile the objective of trade liberalization with other societal values (Articles XX and XXI GATT, Articles XIV and XIV bis GATS).
Here we should add that, in the case of non-compliance with WTO rules, the concrete impact of these rules on individuals will sometimes depend on further decision-making at several stages. Besides the adoption of a rule (in other words the definition of its substance), which constitutes the first stage, the impact of that rule will also depend in a second stage on a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 61 Further, this impact might also depend on the consequence of noncompliance with that ruling (retaliation). 63 , while COTTIER / TAKENOSHITA recall that it is mostly the rulings of the Appellate Body that become increasingly intrusive, putting democracy at home at risk. These authors are therefore distinguishing the issue of rulings from the issue of substantive WTO rules and disciplines that result from the political process. 64 Thus we note that applying the material distinction between executive and legislative powers to draw up a typology of WTO decisions allows us to identify certain decisions that, because of their impact on the individuals, can be considered as being of a legislative type.
Comments on legitimacy requirements
Traditionally, the main legitimacy sources of international law-making have been the principles of state's consent and sovereign equality between states. 65 The issue of state sovereignty in the WTO seems to be resolved through the consensual mode of WTO decision-making according to which, each state that gives powers to the WTO has consented to do so. 66 In this traditional setting, democracy is not a concern.
Many authors in discussing the specific nature of WTO powers have shown the weakness of this structure and have claimed the existence of a democratic deficit, 67 while others have denied it. 68 Several theories have been developed to explain this democratic deficit. 2004), who spells out conditions that make constraints on national policy-making acceptable: relevant areas are clearly specified; participation is voluntary and reversible; the governments and legislators concerned are duly legitimized to bind their country (p. 134). He argues that the policy constraints of the GATS are weak, that they are without bite (p. 136). Speaking of the sanctions, he points out that the only consequence for a country that fails to correct a disputed measure or to agree on After coming to the conclusion that WTO law needs to meet national democratic constitutional standards, KRAJEWSKI uses the chain of legitimacy concept to explain that this standard is far from being effectively applied. 69 HOWSE refers to the legitimacy gap theory, distinguishing between formal legitimacy that is met pursuant to the standards of international law, and social legitimacy that is not met in the WTO context; 70 he also refers to the agency cost theory to explain why democratic features of WTO decision-making are insufficient. 71 In the following sections, we analyse the procedural modes and the composition of the organs of WTO decision-making, and then take a look at some reform proposals that have been made regarding their design with a view to improve the legitimacy and efficiency of the process.
1.2.
Procedural modes of decision-making
The legal rules
The WTO Agreement contains several provisions on procedural modes of decisionmaking.
First, Article IX provides that "the WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue
shall be decided by voting", stating further than each Member of the WTO shall have one vote. Thus, the WTO Agreement formally recognizes the practice of decisionmaking by consensus, prescribing voting as a subsidiary means. Some decisions must be taken by consensus according to the WTO Agreement (mandated consensus). 72 In addition, WTO Members took several decisions prescribing that certain decisions would be taken by consensus instead of voting (consensus in lieu of voting). 73 Some other provisions about decision-making procedures can be found in the Rules of Procedure of each body, 74 as well as in some WTO Multilateral Agreements and their Annexes. 75 A common feature of the Rules of Procedure of the various organs is Article 33 which states that a decision that cannot be reached by consensus in a lower organ should be referred to the higher body.
Comments on the formal rules
We observe that some rules of the WTO agreements reflect the principle that different legitimacy requirements shall be fulfilled depending on the type of decision to be adopted, thus expressing the idea of a varying legitimization requirement. For instance, Article X WTO Agreement provides for different majority requirements, depending on the type of amendment to be adopted. 76 Generally, we observe that some decisions, like authoritative interpretations and waivers, only require the formal acceptance of the WTO representatives of a certain majority of Members, while others, like the decisions amending the treaties, must be submitted to the Members for acceptance, which means they need to be ratified by their constituencies. Further, amendments that do not alter the rights and obligations of the Members can be imposed on Members that have not accepted them.
By means of these distinctions, we can identify different types of decisions taken by the Ministerial Conference and General Council.
We could consider the decisions amending the articles mentioned in Paragraph 6 as being of a constitutional type, while the decisions on amendments that alter the rights and obligations of Members could be seen as being of a legislative type, and those that do not alter the rights and obligations of Members as being of a "soft" legislative type. Finally, decisions on authoritative interpretations and waivers could be seen as being more executive in nature.
A second type of WTO procedural rules that reflect legitimacy concerns is Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of most bodies. By prescribing that a decision that 75 For instance, Annex II of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII GATT (Technical Committee on Customs Valuations) contains detailed dispositions on the dates of the sessions, the setting of the agenda, the powers of the Chairman, quorum and voting, languages and records. 76 As a general principle, paragraph 4 of Article X states that amendments shall take effect for all Members upon acceptance by two-thirds of them. However, the amendment of certain clauses requires specific treatment. According to Paragraph 3, amendments that would alter the rights and obligations of the Members take effect only for the Members that have accepted them (in such cases the Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths majority if the Members that have not accepted the amendments are free to withdraw from the Organization or if they can remain a Member). Pursuant to Paragraph 2, five provisions require the acceptance of all Members to be amended: these are Article X of the WTO Agreement itself (provisions on amendments), Article IX WTO Agreement (rules on decision-making), Articles I and II GATT (MostFavoured-Nation Treatment and Schedules of Concessions), Article II: 1 GATS (MostFavoured-Nation Treatment) and Article 4 TRIPS (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment). Article X: 6, by reference to Article 71:2 TRIPS, applies to amendments to multilateral agreements outside the WTO serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of protection of intellectual property rights and provides that such amendments may be adopted by the Minsterial Conference, on the basis of a consensual proposal of the TRIPS Council, without further acceptance process if these amendments are achieved, in force and accepted by all WTO Members under those agreements. Finally, Article XII WTO Agreement states that the Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-third majority of the Members. cannot be reached by consensus in a lower organ should be referred to the higher organ, this rule assumes on the one hand that when a consensus is reached, the decision is deemed legitimated even if it is adopted in a lower organ; 77 whereas on the other hand, it assumes that higher organs are endowed with higher legitimacy since the step towards other modes of decision-making (voting) may occur only at this level. In the next section, we try to explain how this can be justified, by analysing the composition of WTO organs.
1.2.3.
In practice
In practice, voting in the WTO never takes place. COTTIER/TAKENOSHITA believe that "the main reason for avoiding voting lies in the fact that the principle of one member one vote does not reflect economic interests and real powers within the multilateral trading system"; these authors then show the imbalance and material inequality of representation between Members that exist in terms of voting rights with respect to their shares of financial contributions to the WTO, gross domestic products (GDP) and voting rates. 78 We will return later to the consequences that consensus decision-making has on legitimacy with respect to the balance of power within the organization.
What we want to address here are the informal practices that lead to the formal adoption of a decision by consensus in one of the WTO bodies. We will distinguish between consensus as the formal means of adopting a decision and consensus as the process of reaching that decision. The former consists of a "non-objection" and is referred to as "passive consensus", while the latter is referred to as "active consensus".
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Active consensus (or consensus-building) transforms the decision-making process into a negotiating process that aims at reaching a bargain made of mutual concessions, which are often of a "crossing" character as a consequence of the single undertaking principle.
80
Some of these informal consultations potentially involve the entire membership, for example, the meetings of the Heads of Delegations (attended by senior diplomats or specialists coming from capitals), although smaller groups are sometimes convened. 77 KUIJPER who supports this view, considers that this creates " a certain tension between efficiency and legitimacy" (p. 109). The question that arises here is whether a decision reached by consensus by the lower body is definitive (p. (2003), p. 179; further argue that "current voting rules in WTO fail to respond to the requirement that majority voting procedures need to be able to assure that major trading partners in the system keep an interest in dealing with each other on the basis of the WTO law", with the risk that they will leave the system. 79 See FOOTER (2005), p. 138. 80 The single undertaking principle implies that the whole result of a negotiation will be adopted by the entire membership, in other words that a Member cannot pick those parts of the bargain that are acceptable and leave others aside. Crossing concessions means that a package deal can cover different issue-areas (for example, concessions in the field of service are balanced with concessions in the agriculture field).
This smaller group feature is a response to the principle of efficiency since a technique is required to reconcile the diverging views of a broad membership, 81 which BLACKHURST has well described as a "concentric circles model". This model includes the well known "green room meetings" where the most powerful countries participate first. These meetings can be held during the Ministerial Conferences or they can take place in Geneva at the ambassadorial level.
Linked to such meetings is the phenomenon of alliance building, which may consist of geographical groupings (economic integration) 82 or interests groupings, 83 and which allow countries to increase their bargaining power and get specific items onto the agenda.
Comments on the practice of WTO decision-making
In this section, we consider the effects of consensual decision-making in the WTO on legitimacy issues. Here we must distinguish between the international law perspective that takes into account the state sovereignty issue, and the democratic perspective. Differing views are expressed on the issue of state sovereignty. Some authors argue that consensus amounts to giving each member a right of veto and that this is consistent with the principle of equal sovereignty of states, therefore enhancing the legitimacy of decisions. 84 This increase of legitimacy will translate into a better implementation of WTO rules since no Member will have to implement a decision against its will.
On the other hand, some argue that this equality between states is only formal and that consensus in fact reflects the underlying power relationships between Members, taking the form of an implicit weighted voting system pursuant to the major interests' norm; 85 some refer to the varying "consensus-resistance" capacity of states. 86 For FOOTER, 87 "consensus decision-making for all its flaws sustains the delicate balance between equality of voting power and parity of (economic) interest among the Members". Furthermore, some claim that consensus corresponds to the very nature of WTO obligations, which as a consequence of the single undertaking principle are contractual, meaning that they must be mutually beneficial and agreed on both sides.
Second, consensus decision-making may have an impact on democratic legitimacy. Many authors have been calling for reforms that would enhance the efficiency of the WTO political branch to counter an eventual legal activism of the WTO judiciary branch that occurs without any legitimacy check. These reform proposals are addressed in a subsequent section of this article.
Further, one important feature of the consensus practice is the reinforced role of the chairperson of meetings, who structures discussions and decides whether certain issues will be discussed separately and how to resolve deadlocks. 88 Because of this broad influence, it is recognized that there should be some parity in the nomination of chairpersons; also, some of their formal functions are set up in the Rules of Procedure of several bodies.
Finally, since the process of consensus-building takes place outside formal meetings of WTO organs, it can allow a wider range of actors to participate, including non-state actors or non-member countries.
1.3.
The organ of decision-making Again, we shall distinguish here whether we assess the composition of WTO bodies from the perspective of state sovereignty (international law conception of legitimacy) or from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of state sovereignty (membership's representation), the rule is that all bodies of the WTO are bodies of the whole. 89 There are, however, some formal exceptions.
First there can be bodies of limited composition drawn from the membership, such as the former Textiles Monitoring Body. 90 Second, some bodies of limited composition are made up of experts from outside the organization who are chosen by the Members, such as the Permanent Group of Experts (PGE) under the SCM Agreement. 91 Notably, the WTO has not established a body of limited composition that would exercise some kind of executive function, as was the case for a limited time during the GATT era with the Consultative Group of Eighteen.
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Here it is important to consider how these formal rules perform in practice. First, it should be noted that many countries do not have the capacity to send representatives attend every meeting; 93 in combination with Rule 33 of the Rule of Procedures referred to above, this can have serious consequences on the equal sovereignty of states principle as we explained earlier that decisions adopted by consensus in lower bodies may be definitive. 94 We note also that the informal practices leading to the adoption of decisions involve the emergence of groups of limited composition that are sometimes selfelected, thus excluding some countries from participation.
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From the democratic legitimacy perspective, the composition of the Members' delegations must be scrutinized with respect to representation of national constituencies. In this respect, we observe that the Ministerial Conference is composed of the ministers from the Member countries, whereas the General Council gathers higher-level ambassadors and the lower bodies representatives of the states who may be technical experts. 96 Further, the practice of rule-referencing means that the composition of bodies outside the WTO should also be scrutinized. 97 We note that the logic lying behind Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure as well as the broad powers given by the agreements to the Ministerial Conference and General Council suppose that these organs are capable of conferring higher legitimacy than lower bodies to the decisions they adopt. This is relevant with respect to the reform proposals that follow.
Reform proposals -Conclusion
Using as a framework the approach consisting in distinguishing the three parameters of decision-making, we consider in the following various reform proposals put forward by some authors to enhance either the legitimacy or the efficiency of WTO decision-making; we also explain how both issues are closely intertwined.
Regarding the procedural mode of decision-making, most reform proposals aim first at improving efficiency. Some authors propose to give up consensus and replace it with a weighted voting system.
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, while others suggest some "fine tuning" of the consensual mode. From this latter perspective, the idea of a "critical mass" would imply that a Member should refrain from blocking a decision which is supported by a significant amount of countries 99 ; as well, another proposal prescribes that a Member who is blocking a decision that otherwise enjoys broad support would 93 have to declare in writing that the matter on which the decision is being taken is of vital interest to it. 100 Moreover, some authors have suggested departing from the single undertaking principle in order to enhance efficiency, 101 while others have also argued that the way powers are distributed within the hierarchical structure of the organization bodies can have an impact on efficiency.
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Concerning the impact of these proposals on legitimacy, we note that enhancing efficiency can on the one hand simultaneously enhance legitimacy; this is the case regarding the balance of powers' issue. In this context, enhancing the efficiency of the WTO political branch would allow some legitimacy check to be made on the judiciary branch's output.
On the other hand, efficiency and legitimacy can sometimes collide. When enhancing efficiency implies formally departing from the consensus mode of decision-making, it has a negative impact on legitimacy from the perspective of the sovereign equality of states. In this respect, we have seen however that even the consensus mode of decision-making in its present design, with all the informal practices it entails, does not promote legitimacy in that sense; that form of legitimacy could be enhanced by formalizing the practices of consensus decision-making and increasing its transparency, as advocated in several reform proposals.
In addition, proposals that aim at rationalizing the work of the WTO by distributing powers more optimally to the lower organs can have a negative impact on both forms of legitimacy (in the sense of the sovereign equality of states and in the sense of democratic legitimacy) since lower bodies are often neither representative of the membership of the organization nor of the national constituencies of the members. Here, a balance must be found.
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Regarding the composition of WTO organs, some authors have suggested the creation of a limited-size subgroup of members that would steer the WTO political process based on the model of the Consultative Group of Eighteen under the GATT, therefore enhancing efficiency. This group would be established on a transparent, predictable, equitable, as well as legitimate basis in the eyes of all Members, formalizing in some way the actual decision-making practices. It would be composed of self-selected groups of countries that would help to compensate for the shortage of resources in some least-developed countries.
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Another proposal is to reinforce the involvement of high-ranking political leaders to give greater impulse to the process. 105 To some, greater involvement of political leaders would also enhance the democratic legitimacy of 100 See: Sutherland Report, 64, paras. 287 and 289. 101 See HOWSE (2003) . 102 Generally, it appears that, in the proceedings of international organizations, States will be less likely to object to decisions taken in lower organs when these decisions require the subsequent approval of a higher organ before they become final. See decision-making; 106 we note that this is pursuant to the logic of the WTO institutional structure that we have discussed above.
Regarding democratic legitimacy, proposals have been made to involve to a greater extent national parliaments and non-state actors at the WTO level. 107 We argue that the participation of non-state actors should be regulated and that mechanisms should be established to increase its transparency. 108 At the national level, HOWSE advocates extraordinary mechanisms of democratic consent, such as plebiscites on results of the Doha round, with strict campaign rules. Further, he suggests ending the use of package deals, in order to prevent take it or leave it situations that weaken national procedures of legitimization, and to work to create some kind of "ownership" of the results. 109 Finally, some authors have put the focus on the object of decision-making and have suggested not increasing the powers given to the WTO, thus recognizing that the scope of reform on the two other components of decision-making is limited.
After noting that since the very conditions of democracy (deliberation and rational discourse) are not met in the WTO, KRAJEWSKI argues that one solution is either to increase the supply of or decrease the demand for legitimacy. Assuming that the first solution is not feasible, he suggests limiting the WTO mandate and agenda, which would mean refraining from regulating on issues of environmental protection, labour standards, investment protection or competition rules. 110 In line with this proposal, HOWE/NICOLAÏDIS advocate the practice of institutional sensitivity. 111 Furthermore, in order to remedy what he calls the missing legislator, VON BOGDANDY (pp. 651 f.) is pushing the coordinate independence model, which gives high priority to the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members and focuses substantive WTO law solely on concretizing the principle of non-discrimination. 112 In an original way, PAUWELYN links reforms on both the procedure and the object of decision-making. He perceives consensus decision-making as a kind of participation and political input that is part of voice mechanisms; he argues that these voice mechanisms should be reinforced in order to maintain equilibrium with the WTO's high levels of legalization and discipline. In his view, the legitimacy problem of the trading system is best resolved by means of reforms on both sides of what he calls law (judiciary branch) and politics (political branch). Reforms on the law side imply providing some limited exit options to the Members as well as lower discipline; further, the judiciary branch needs to be politically sensitive, sufficient membership control must be maintained, and quality checks on the personnel active in dispute settlement must be increased. Reforms on the politics side imply giving up the single undertaking principle. 114 To conclude this analysis, we want to recall that one of the main challenges of WTO reforms is applying the very concept of democratic legitimacy at the international level. We leave the reader with some thoughts from WEILER/MOTOC who suggest "repacking [democracy] as part of a broader discourse of legitimacy", recalling that legitimacy encompasses elements other than democracy. 
